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Power is a key component in understanding and analyzing global production and the 
governance structures of Global Value Chains. In this paper, we propose a novel 
analytical link between the power dynamics in GVCs and the network configuration 
of their respective production topology. Our proposed link is based on the notion of 
positional power according to which power is associated with the centrality of a sector 
with regards to the production process, the sector belongs to. Using global input-output 
data, we show that the network structure of global production is associated with the 
global distribution of profits among national economic sectors and, consequently, 
influences the power relations and thus the governance structures of supply networks. 
More specifically, we find a high correlation between the distribution of profits and a 
sector’s position in global production, captured by its total strength centrality. Based 
on this, we provide a quantitative measure of positional power within global production 
and its governance structures. 
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1 Introduction  
Since the early 1990s, the frameworks of Global Commodity Chains (GCCs), Global 
Value Chains (GVCs) and Global Production Networks (GPNs) have dominated the 
analysis of global production and circulation. Sometimes conflicting and divergent, and 
other times complementary and synthesizing, these approaches highlight the inner 
mechanisms that allow multinational corporations to coordinate, and eventually, 
dominate a geographically dispersed, and functionally specialized, global supply 
system. Following an interdisciplinary methodology, the aforementioned frameworks 
have managed to form their analytical locus within international political economy and 
to promote distinctive literature for the analysis of world capitalism (Coe and Yeung, 
2015; Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005; Henderson et al., 2002).  
 In this analysis, the concept of power is central. Power translates into the ability of 
lead firms to shape governance structures to dominate their respective value-chains or 
production-networks, and consequently capture the highest possible amount of value-
added. Each analytical approach focuses on different levels of production and places 
emphasis on different aspects (or dimensions) of power relations. For example, the 
GCC framework focuses on the technological differences of production processes to 
explain the birth and evolution of global commodity chains, driven by either large and 
powerful producers (Producer-Driven) or sizeable and dominant buyers (Buyer-Driven) 
(Gereffi, 1994). On the other hand, several contributions using or extending the GPN 
framework stress the bidimensionality of power, which is perceived as both a 
topological characteristic of the position (positionality) each actor holds in the 
production network, as well as a relational attribute of the exchange relations between 
network participants (Coe and Yeung, 2015; Henderson et al., 2002). Specifically, the 
more recent version of the GPN framework, known as GPN 2.0, goes one step further, 
arguing that power relations and asymmetries are latently embedded into specific 
configurations of global production networks.  
 Depending on the level of analysis, one can analyze the power characteristics of a 
firm, sector or supply chain. We acknowledge that the specific choice of a level of 
analysis comes with both advantages and drawbacks. While the focus on a firm-level 
is able to provide detailed insights regarding the dynamics of specific firms, it lacks 
the generality of the policy implications that come when choosing to focus on the whole 
supply chain and vice-versa. In this paper, we analyze power on the level of a national 
sector. This choice has two important advantages. First, it takes into account both the 
geographical dispersion and the overall production process. Second, it allows for 
quantitative analysis of power relations given the availability of relevant data from the 
World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015) and the OECD Inter-Country 
Input-Output Tables (ICIO) database (OECD, 2018a). 
 Focusing on the links between the functional and spatial structures of global 
production on the one hand, and power dynamics and profit distribution, on the other, 
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we argue that the network characteristics regarding the centrality of production agents 
are closely related to the patterns of profit distribution between global economic 
sectors. Assuming that profit distribution is both conceptually and empirically linked 
to the economic, political and institutional power of economic agents, our approach 
allows drawing a set of conclusions on the power asymmetries between economic actors 
(Bowles et al., 1986, 1990; Gordon et al., 1987). More specifically, we analyze the 
topological (positional) dimension of power in production networks, captured by 
relevant measures of centrality used in economic and social networks (Jackson, 2008).  
 Applying different correlation tests, we show that the centrality of economic sectors 
is correlated to their profit shares. In order to have a complete analysis on the various 
influences on profitability, including the different versions of positional power captured 
by the various centrality measures, we would need to run regressions. These regressions 
should incorporate firm-level data like concentration ratios, firms’ age and size, etc. 
(Pervan et al., 2019), which would require a geographical and sectoral reduction (based 
on the countries and sectors of analysis). Due to this tradeoff, we focus here on the 
correlation between centrality measures using the highest possible number of countries, 
and we discuss in conclusion the necessary steps towards an econometric analysis with 
more variables.   
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of power, 
with a particular focus on the notion of positional power. In Section 3 we introduce 
the concept of network centrality and elaborate on how centrality is able to identify 
the key actors in a multilayered and complex global production system. Section 4 
describes the data and methodology we follow in our empirical analysis. Section 5 
presents the key findings of our correlation tests, whereas Section 6 concludes and 
proposes possible directions for future research. 
2 Power in Global Production 
Starting with the notion of governance structures, defined as the ‘authority and power 
relationships that determine how financial, material and human resources are allocated 
and flow within a chain’ (Gereffi, 1994: 97), Gereffi provided the first conceptualisation 
of inter-firm power relations in a commodity chain. His dichotomy between producer-
driven (PD) and buyer-driven (BD) value-chains broke new ground by constructing a 
framework to analyse global production processes. However, it was critiqued for 
treating the process as too static, forbidding the co-existence of BD and PD governance 
structure along the same value-chain (Dallas et al., 2019: 669) and leaving little room 
for analyzing the transformation of governance structures (Gibbon et al., 2008).  
 As a result, a new framework initiated by Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) 
– global value chains – attempted to overcome the limitations of GCCs while 
simultaneously expanding its analytical scope. As far as power relations were 
concerned, Gereffi et al. (2005) proposed the well-known fivefold typology of 
governance structures (Market, Modular, Relative, Captive, Hierarchical) dependent 
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upon three factors: the complexity of transactions, codifiability of information, and 
supply-base capabilities. In turn, these governance structures corresponded to a 
continuum of degrees of explicit coordination and power asymmetry, spanning from 
low values characterizing the market governance structure, to higher and higher values, 
as the structures move from the market towards hierarchical governance structures. 
 Despite the improvements proposed by Gereffi et al.’s. (2005) new governance 
typology, many maintained that it remained still too static and homogenized in nature, 
with geographical, social and institutional specificities unaccounted for (Coe et al., 
2008; Dicken et al., 2001; Gibbon et al., 2008; Henderson et al., 2002). This critique 
led to the development of a new framework, the GPN, which conceptualized the world 
economy as a network connecting different economic and non-economic actors. In this 
way, the notion of power reflects both the topological-positional characteristics of 
network actors (structural dimension) and the qualitative characteristics of the 
linkages in a production network (relational dimension) (Dicken et al., 2001: 93). A 
succeeding version of the GPN framework, the GPN 2.0 put more emphasis on the 
analytical role played by network configurations, as the reflection of the actor-specific 
strategies, with respect to power dynamics, highlighting the importance of actor-
specific strategies, shaped by the confrontation of network agents against certain 
competitive dynamics (Coe and Yeung, 2015: 65). 
 The aforementioned literature sparked a vibrant discussion around the issues of 
power under transnational capitalism. Each stage of that discussion identified 
important limitations in the respective analytical frameworks and thus paved the way 
for the subsequent theoretical and empirical development (Dallas et al., 2019; Galanis 
and Kumar, 2020; Mahutga, 2014a; Rutherford and Holmes, 2008; Tonts et al., 2012). 
Recently, Dallas et al. (2019) summarized the discussion of power relations in this 
extended literature of value-chains and production-networks, proposing their own 
power typology. This new typology incorporates the diverse multidimensionalities that 
have been found in the literature and proposes a ‘systematic framework that draws 
from the varied implicit usages of power in GVC and GVC-adjacent literature’ (Dallas 
et al., 2019: 667). The new typology consists of four types of power relations 
(bargaining, demonstrative, institutional, constitutive). It is based on the combination 
of direct or diffuse ‘transmission mechanisms’ and dyadic or collective actor-specific 
‘arenas of actors’. For instance, the bargaining type of power is consistent with dyadic 
and directly transmitted power relations established between actors in value-chain and 
production-networks, while the demonstrative type of power reflects situations of 
dyadic diffused relationships. Likewise, the institutional and constitutive types of 
power correspond to power relations that are transmitted in collectively direct and 
collectively diffuse ways, respectively. 
 In parallel with the above literature on power relations, there have been numerous 
attempts to empirically analyse global value chains, in terms of the depth of the 
phenomenon of spatial production fragmentation and the re-integration of the global 
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economy through international trade. These attempts, heavily borrow analytical tools 
from Input-Output Analysis and network theory, in order to assess the extent of 
production fragmentation (Antràs et al., 2012; Antràs and Chor, 2017; Feenstra, 1998; 
Milberg and Winkler, 2013), to explore the structural characteristics of international 
trade patterns (Fagiolo et al., 2009; Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011; Serrano and 
Boguñá, 2003), to analyse the shock propagation properties of global production 
structures (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Gabaix, 2011) and to measure the volumes of value-
added in exports and imports of trading nations (Hummels et al., 2001; Johnson, 2018; 
Koopman et al., 2012; OECD, 2018b). 
 However, the literature on power relations in GVCs and the international trade and 
GVC-participation empirical literature has not yet produced any meaningful synthesis 
with the exception of Mahutga, who in a series of papers (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) focuses 
on the positional conceptualization of power. More specifically, building upon Power-
Dependence Theory (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1962), he introduces the 
concept of positionality to express the power attributes of the lead-firms in an economic 
network. Assuming that the country-specific trade patterns of industrial sectors reflect 
the behaviour of the lead firms in BD and PD networks, he measures the positional 
power of countries participating in the most characteristic examples of buyer- and 
producer-driven networks (namely, the garment and transportation equipment 
industries, respectively). In this way, the positional power of a country in a BD trade 
network will depend on the import content of its exports, implying that the higher the 
share of its imports to the exports of its trading partners, the higher the number of 
business relationships with many ‘dependent import partners’ (Mahutga, 2014a: 167). 
The exact opposite is expected for countries in a PD trade network.  
 In this paper, we turn the focus to the positional power of national sectors and only 
apply correlation tests in order to take into account the maximum geographical 
dispersion of the IOTs. We argue that this is possible by empirically exploring the 
power dynamics and asymmetries of national sectors, as these are manifested through 
global IOTs. Taking into account the inter-sectoral idiosyncrasies of global sectors, we 
add one piece of missing information on the analysis of trade patterns between 
countries. Moreover, insofar as the discussion for power relations within the GVC and 
GVC-adjacent literatures evaluates the dynamics between buyers and suppliers 
positioned in different sectors of the economy, then utilizing input-output data is a 
prerequisite for a consequential analysis of global power asymmetries. Notwithstanding 
the fact that a sectoral analysis of power in the GVC framework comes with the cost 
of simplifying from the level of the firm as the analytical unit, we contend that we 
have something to gain analytically from the high dimensions of the databases that 
provide country- and sector-specific input-output data (see Section 4), which will 
ultimately reduce aggregation bias.  
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3 Production, Network Centrality and Power 
Any (global) production process can be described as a series of value-added processes 
where the outputs of one process are the inputs of another. This complex procedure 
can be depicted through a production network, with each node representing national 
economic sectors and their links the value of their respective transactions. Within a 
network, the position of a node can be captured by different measures of centrality, 
and over time new measures are being developed (Jackson, 2008). Hence the centrality 
of an economic sector is a key component regarding the topological-positional 
dimension of power relations. 
 Using IOTs, we are able to calculate the centrality of each node-sector and quantify 
the topological characteristics of global production, simultaneously at the functional 
and geographical level. In turn, these topological characteristics reflect the influence 
or power that each node-sector possesses in the whole network. This is a well-
established fact in the literatures of economic sociology and social network analysis 
(Freeman, 1978; Yeung and Coe, 2015: 65). In this way, the position of firms in the 
production process becomes the key ingredient of their power with respect to their 
competitors, partners and employees. The same applies to the sectoral level, as well.  
 Here we consider the centrality measures of Degree, Strength and PageRank . Degree 
is the most widely used centrality measure, defined as the number of links 
(connections) a node has with the rest of the nodes. For directed networks, we have 
to distinguish between incoming and outgoing economic transactions and thus 
introduce two types of degree centralities, the In-Degree, that counts all the 
transactions that point to sector i, and Out-Degree, which counts the outgoing 
transactions originated from sector i. Then Total-Degree is simply the sum of the two-
directional measures of the number of links. So, in our context, degree centrality 
measures the number of business relationships that have been built between economic 
sectors. Strength centrality takes into account the volumes of inflows and outflows of 
inputs and outputs, between sectors in an economy. As in the case of degree centrality, 
we can distinguish between in-strength, measuring the volume of inflows to an 
economic sector, and out-strength, measuring the volume of outflows from a sector. 
The sum of two will give the total strength. In our context, degree and strength 
centralities capture the number and weight of the business relationships established 
among the various sectors of the world economy.  
 However, these two centrality types only take into account only the direct 
production links of an economic sector, its nearest neighbours, in other words, 
irrespective of those neighbours’ position in the overall structure of the economic 
network. This means that they do not take into account the possible power of a node 
that may have few links but with “powerful” nodes that could provide the first node 
with positional power. Considering this shortcoming and the need to uncover the effects 
 7 
of the rest of the sectors within a network, global centrality measures have been 
proposed, such as Eigenvector and PageRank centralities (Jackson, 2008).  
 Eigenvector centrality is defined as the sum of the links connecting a sector with its 
neighbours. In eigenvector centrality, each link connecting the node under 
consideration with the neighbouring nodes has a different weight, based on the 
centrality of the latter. That is, the centrality of a node depends not only on the 
number of links it has established with other nodes, but also on the number of links 
those other nodes have established with their neighbours, as well. Thus, for example, 
a sector has higher eigenvector centrality if it is connected to more connected sectors. 
 A variant of the eigenvector centrality measure was introduced by the founders of 
Google search engine, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, who developed, along with Rajeev 
Motwani and Terry Winograd, a computer algorithm for rating and ranking webpages 
based on their importance (Page et al., 1999). PageRank centrality instead of 
calculating a centrality score proportional to the centrality of neighbouring nodes, it 
scales the effect of those nodes that have a large number of outgoing links. 
Consequently, a sector will be highly central in terms of the PageRank centrality 
measure, if it is connected to highly connected sectors that have gained their 
importance, although they have a large number of out-going links. In that way, 
PageRank centrality controls for those cases of economic sectors, which under the 
eigenvector centrality measure, would have accumulated high scores of centralities, 
merely since they have established business relationships with large input providers, 
for example, energy, transportation and financial intermediation, services.  
 
3.1 A Network Example 
In Figure 1, we have plotted a hypothesized production network, with each node 
expressing an economic sector, and the links connecting them, the value of transactions 
between them. The sub-graph (b) shows the input-output intermediate goods/services 
table that functions as the ‘recipe’ of the production network. Each row shows how 
much each sector’s output has been distributed to the economy and used as inputs. 
Likewise, each column shows how much inputs, each sector will purchase from the 
other sectors of the economy, to produce its respective output. 
 Based on the information of the input-output table, we can calculate, in sub-graph 
(c), the centralities of every sector in the economy. As we can see, each measure 
highlights the different properties of the structure of the production network. For 
instance, with degree centrality, we get the information that the most important 
(central) sectors are A and F, while sectors B, C, E, and G, share the same amount of 
positional power. A different picture is given when we consider the measure of strength 
centrality.  
 Here we observe that the value of transactions between the sectors of a production 
process, matters for their relative positional power. Whereas in the previous example 
of degree centrality we could not make any conclusion regarding the relative power of 
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sectors B, C, E and G, now with strength centrality, we have a clear ranking of power 
asymmetries. PageRank centrality, on the other hand, takes into account how central 
the neighbors of a node are, and thus modifies the ranking output of strength centrality 
analogously.  
 
Figure 1 Centrality Measures in a Hypothesized Production Network  
 
Source: Own Calculation. Notes: Sub-graph (a) is the visualization of a production network. Each 
node represents one of the sectors of our hypothesized economy. The thickness of each link is 
indicative of the volume/value of the transaction. In sub-graph (b) we have plotted an input-output 
table of intermediate goods of the hypothesized economy. The rows show the producing sectors and 
the columns the consuming sectors. Each element of the input-output table expresses the value of 
transactions between sectors. In sub-graph (c) we have calculated the Degree, Strength and PageRank 
centralities for every node-sector of the economy.  
 
 The reason why we concentrate on these three types of centrality measures, is 
implicitly given by the previous discussion. Degree, strength and PageRank 
centralities, as the fundamental measures of positional influence, give us information 
for both the multitude of links, as well as the strength and depth of the connections of 
a network node. Consequently, computing these three centrality measures we are able 
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to make significant conclusions about the topological power of a node5. Even though 
the different types of centrality measures capture different aspects of power, it does 
not mean that each of these will be similarly correlated with profits. In the next section, 
we find these correlations. 
4 Data and Methodology  
For our calculations, we use four databases from the WIOD and the collection of ICIO 
Tables, offered by OECD, for different industry classifications and time ranges. The 
WIOD comes into two versions, at basic prices in millions of US dollars. The 2013 
version covers 35 economic sectors (ISIC Rev.3), for 40 countries and a proxy for the 
Rest-of-the-World (RoW), from 1995 to 2011. The 2016 version of the WIOD, on the 
other hand, covers 56 economic sectors (ISIC Rev.4) for 44 countries (including an 
estimate the RoW), from 2000 to 2014. The OECD database (OECD, 2018a) provides 
time-series global IOTs in two versions, as well. The first version covers 34 industries 
(ISIC Rev.3) for 64 OECD and non-OECD countries, including an estimate of the 
RoW from 1995 to 2011, while the second version covers 36 industries (ISIC Rev.4) 
for 65 countries (plus RoW), from 2005-2015. Table 1 summarizes the basic 
information for the four network configurations. The number of country-sector nodes 
is less by one country because we had to exclude the RoW, due to the unavailability 
of data regarding value-added components (labour and capital income). The complete 
lists of countries and sectors covered by the databases can be found in Supplementary 
Materials. 
 






Sectors Countries Nodes 
Average 
Links 
WIOD 1995-2011 ISIC-Rev.3 35 40 1,400 1,763,906 
WIOD 2000-2014 ISIC-Rev.4 56 43 2,408 5,039,876 
OECD 1995-2011 ISIC-Rev.3 34 63 2,142 2,287,321 
OECD 2005-2015 ISIC-Rev.4 36 64 2,304 4,408,763 
 
Source: Own Calculation 
 
 Based on these four global production network data, we are able to capture the 
positional power of each sector, by calculating the degree, strength and PageRank 
centralities and explore their behavior against sector-specific shares of profit 
distribution. Profit distribution shares are computed by dividing the Gross Operating 
Surplus (GOS) component of the Value-Added of each sector, in each country, over 
 
5 For more details regarding the mathematical formulations of the various centrality measures see 
Estrada and Knight (2015). 
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the total amount of GOS generated in the global economy. OECD database provides 
direct estimates of the GOS. The WIOD IOTs, however, have been constructed in 
terms of Gross Value-Added (GVA) and thus, to compute the GOS, we had to subtract 
from GVA the amount of employees’ compensation for each sector, in each country 
and for the total global IOTs. For the analysis of the association between sector-specific 
positional power, measured by centrality, and GOS, we apply both a parametric 
(Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman and Kendall) correlation tests, over the 
whole period.  
 We perform two types of correlation tests: First, the parametric Pearson correlation 
test is designed for samples that follow a normal distribution. For non-normal 
distribution, it is more appropriate to use non-parametric correlation statistics, 
especially if we are dealing with heavy-tailed distributions, as is the cases with 
centralities and sectoral profit-shares (de Winter et al., 2016). In particular, Spearman 
ρ and Kendall τ, seem to have better statistical properties with non-normal 
distributions compared to Pearson’s r, and are invariant to monotonic transformations, 
such as the log-transformation that we apply on our data (Li et al., 2012). The 
distributional characteristics of the three centrality measures can be found in the 
Appendix (Figure 4). They show a clear non-normal distribution and thus jsutify our 
decision to consider, the non-parametric choices of Spearman and Kendall, additional 
to the Pearson’s correlation test. Second, we want to explore how the relationship 
between profit distribution and positional power behaves in cases of non-linearities, a 
task that is best performed with the rank-based Spearman and Kendall correlation 
coefficients estimates. 
5 Empirical Results  
Figure 2Error! Reference source not found. captures the behavior of the three 
correlation coefficients, for every year covered by the IOTs. Each row of the figure 
corresponds to a production network configuration based on the four databases. 
Equally, each column of the figure corresponds to one of the three correlation 
measurements that we have used in our analysis, the Pearson, the Spearman and the 
Kendall. Lastly, each line corresponds to one of the three centrality measures, namely 
total-degree, total-strength and PageRank. In the Appendix (Table 2) we gather all 
the results for the three correlation tests applied over the relationship between 
positional power, measured by three alternative measures of node centrality, and 
sectoral profit-shares, in log-log scales6. 
 
6 For the application of the log-log transformation, we had to exclude those values of centralities and 
shares of profitability, that were equal to zero since the natural logarithm of zero is undetermined. 
Excluding the zero values from the data eventually reduced the size of each dataset, by 10% for the 
WIOD (ISIC3), 8% for WIOD (ISIC4), 17% for OECD (ISIC3) and 8% for OECD (ISIC4). However, 
the impact on the co-movement conclusions is minor, because country-sectors with zero centralities 
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 All the parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients are statistically 
significant, for at least 0.1% level of statistical significance. The only exception is the 
relationship between total-degree and profitability for the economic network based on 
WIOD (ISIC3) for six years between 2005 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 2 Correlation Coefficients of Centralities and sectoral shares of GOS 
Source: Own Calculation. Data: WIOD, OECD 
 
 Based on the results, we observe the existence of a roughly stable co-movement 
between centrality measures and profit distribution for strength and PageRank 
centralities. For degree centrality, on the other hand, all correlation tests show a low 
association, with the exception of the OECD (ISIC3) economic network, in which case 
the dataset gives us Pearson and Spearman coefficients in the area of 0.5 – 0.6 and in 
the area of 0.4 for the case of Kendall correlations. A stronger association, though, is 
given by PageRank for all correlation types and network configurations. In particular, 
 
imply that they are positioned at the most disconnected component of the global economic network, 
with no ties to the most connected part of the world economy. 
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the Pearson linear correlation for PageRank versus profitability, varies between 0.55 
and 0.69 for all years and configurations, while Spearman’s rank correlation varies 
between 0.6 and 0.81 and Kendall’s, much lower, between 0.46 and 0.61. However, the 
strongest association between profit distribution and centrality is captured by strength 
centrality. Pearson correlation for strength-profitability varies between 0.75 and 0.92, 
with Spearman and Kendall rank correlations, varying between 0.82 and 0.92 and 0.62 
and 0.75, respectively. A ‘snapshot’ of the relationships between degree, strength and 
PageRank centralities and sectoral profit-distribution, for 2014, is given by Figure 3, 
where we observe the highest correlations with respect to strength centrality, compared 
to PageRank and degree. 
 
 
Figure 3 Correlation Coefficients of Centralities and sectoral shares of GOS, 2014 
Source: Own Calculation. Data: WIOD IOT, 2014 
 
 The low correlation between degree centrality and profit-shares comes as no 
surprise. Since degree centrality captures merely the number of connection of each 
node-sector, and our databases cover no more than 56 economic sectors, it is evident 
to expect that this centrality score will not give us meaningful insights. On the 
contrary, the high correlation of strength and PageRank centralities underlines the 
fact that a relationship between the positional power of industrial sectors and the 
distribution of profit, exists. Moreover, it exists, not only with respect to the volume 
of the transactions of intermediate goods between economic sectors (strength 
centrality), but also with respect to the depth of those relations (PageRank centrality). 
As we underlined in the previous section, PageRank centrality takes into account, not 
only how central, and thus topologically powerful, the immediate (first tier) partners 
of a particular economic sector are, but also how central the partners of those partners 
(second tier), and the partners of the partners of those partners (third tier), and so on. 
For example, whereas a global sector might be characterized by very high strength 
centrality, due to large buyers and/or suppliers, with PageRank centrality we will in 
general have a lower centrality score, since we have incorporated information regarding 
 13 
the centrality scores of higher tier suppliers and buyers. In other words, PageRank 
centrality can be thought of as a successive computation of strength centrality, with 
each other sector’s contribution to the centrality of the sector under consideration, 
fading with each successive stage.  
 The empirical tests that we have applied, strongly suggest a strong positive 
connection between the two variables (node centrality and profits) which, based on 
the respective theories, fairly represent topological and economic power, respectively. 
We should emphasize that the above empirical results do not establish a causal 
relationship between the centrality of economic sectors and their profit distribution. 
In this exercise, we simply want to take a first step towards the above direction, by 
highlighting the fact that the structures of global production, represented by the 
topological characteristics of the numerous fragmented production processes that 
consist a global value chain, can be utilized as an approximation of the positional 
dimension of power.  
 To be sure, one of the key findings of our empirical exercise is that the sectors which 
have managed to hold central positions within the global production process - both 
spatially and functionally - capture relatively higher profits. This is not necessarily 
because those sectors are more productive or supply the markets with more 
competitively priced products. Rather because they have managed to accumulate a 
particular dimension of power, what we have called in this paper, topological-positional 
power.  
6 Conclusions  
Even though the analysis of power relations is a crucial component of the various 
global production frameworks, the concrete conceptualization of power as a 
multidimensional concept that can be empirically and quantitatively explored needs 
further exploration. In this paper, we propose an analytical link between the centrality 
of geographically dispersed sectors, denoting their topological-positional power, and 
the sectoral distribution of profits.  
 Focusing on the network structure and, specifically, on different forms of network 
centrality allowed us to draw a concrete conclusion regarding the power topologies of 
production actors. Using available global input-output data, we show quantitatively 
that, it is those sectors that manage to become large buyers and/or suppliers in the 
global economy who receive the lion’s share of the realized profitability.  
 The present paper can be extended at least three different research paths. The first 
path directs towards the empirical decomposition of the various quantifiable 
dimensions of power in a global production network. For instance, other variables such 
as capital-intensity, access to finance, productivity etc. can be considered on top of the 
topological-geographical and the topological-functional characteristic of each sector, in 
order to have a complete picture of the determining factors of profit distribution. The 
literature on international trade and the effects of globalization provides a wide array 
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of theoretical approaches and empirical econometric techniques that allow for a 
thorough analysis of these issues (Feenstra, 1998; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; 
Stockhammer, 2017). The second path looks towards labour and questions regarding 
the relationship between the workers’ bargaining power and global production 
structures. The third path combines the other two paths and sheds light on the 
functional distribution of income between labor and capital, on the basis of the 
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Figure 4 shows the distributions of centralities for representative years from all 
reference databases. Both strength and PageRank centrality measures seem to follow 
some type of a heavy-tail distribution, with the exception of the degree centralities, 
where the linear part of the CCDF7 plot becomes almost vertical at the right-tail 
region, implying an exponential distribution (Cirillo, 2013). The distributions are 
consistent with those found in other economic networks (Cerina et al., 2015). In Table 
4 we show the results of the correlation tests for the relationship between centralities 
and sectoral profit-shares, in log-log scales. 
 
 
Figure 4 Distributions of Degree, Strength and PageRank Centralities,  
Selected Years 
 
Source: Own Calculation. Data: WIOD-ISIC3 for 1995, OECD-ISIC3 for 2002, WIOD-





7 A complementary cumulative distribution function measures the probability of a variable taking values 
higher than a particular level and is formally defined as ! "! = # ($ > %) = 1 & # ($ ' %). 
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Table 2 Correlation Tests for Centralities against sectoral shares of GOS 
   WIOD(ISIC3)  OECD(ISIC3)    WIOD(ISIC4)  OECD(ISIC4) 









 0.155*** 0.896*** 0.599***     
 n:1270 n:1270 n:1293  n:1776 n:1776 n:1843   n:2196 n:2196 n:2339     
ρ 
 0.140*** 0.884*** 0.725***  0.598*** 0.896*** 0.616***   0.155*** 0.922*** 0.764***     
 n:1270 n:1270 n:1293  n:1776 n:1776 n:1843   n:2196 n:2196 n:2339     
τ 
 0.100*** 0.703*** 0.534***  0.428*** 0.723*** 0.461***   0.110*** 0.759*** 0.581***     









 0.140*** 0.897*** 0.601***     
 n:1267 n:1267 n:1289  n:1777 n:1777 n:1844   n:2215 n:2215 n:2357     
ρ 
 0.100*** 0.887*** 0.731***  0.598*** 0.897*** 0.620***   0.151*** 0.920*** 0.777***     
 n:1267 n:1267 n:1289  n:1777 n:1777 n:1844   n:2215 n:2215 n:2357     
τ 
 0.075*** 0.706*** 0.540***  0.428*** 0.724*** 0.467***   0.109*** 0.755*** 0.594***     









 0.149*** 0.894*** 0.602***     
 n:1271 n:1271 n:1293  n:1780 n:1780 n:1847   n:2215 n:2215 n:2357     
ρ 
 0.080*** 0.893*** 0.730***  0.583*** 0.897*** 0.618***   0.156*** 0.918*** 0.786***     
 n:1271 n:1271 n:1293  n:1780 n:1780 n:1847   n:2215 n:2215 n:2357     
τ 
 0.063*** 0.714*** 0.540***  0.416*** 0.723*** 0.467***   0.110*** 0.755*** 0.603***     









 0.167*** 0.894*** 0.600***     
 n:1271 n:1271 n:1293  n:1805 n:1805 n:1872   n:2214 n:2214 n:2356     
ρ 
 0.114*** 0.894*** 0.740***  0.573*** 0.892*** 0.623***   0.153*** 0.914*** 0.798***     
 n:1271 n:1271 n:1293  n:1805 n:1805 n:1872   n:2214 n:2214 n:2356     
τ 
 0.083*** 0.718*** 0.550***  0.410*** 0.717*** 0.475***   0.108*** 0.749*** 0.615***     









 0.084*** 0.919*** 0.597***     
 n:1276 n:1276 n:1297  n:1819 n:1819 n:1886   n:2220 n:2220 n:2362     
ρ 
 0.113*** 0.897*** 0.743***  0.573*** 0.891*** 0.627***   0.143*** 0.919*** 0.800***     
 n:1276 n:1276 n:1297  n:1819 n:1819 n:1886   n:2220 n:2220 n:2362     
τ 
 0.081*** 0.721*** 0.551***  0.409*** 0.717*** 0.479***   0.101*** 0.754*** 0.617***     




Table 2 (continued) 
   WIOD(ISIC3)  OECD(ISIC3)    WIOD(ISIC4)  OECD(ISIC4) 









 0.149*** 0.896*** 0.597***  0.208*** 0.929*** 0.693*** 
 n:1274 n:1274 n:1298  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2215 n:2215 n:2358  n:2149 n:2149 n:2219 
ρ 
 0.051* 0.898*** 0.740***  0.578*** 0.891*** 0.626***   0.134*** 0.915*** 0.803***  0.446*** 0.918*** 0.687*** 
 n:1274 n:1274 n:1298  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2215 n:2215 n:2358  n:2149 n:2149 n:2219 
τ 
 0.039** 0.720*** 0.551***  0.413*** 0.716*** 0.478***   0.097*** 0.749*** 0.620***  0.314*** 0.758*** 0.539*** 









 0.157*** 0.893*** 0.594***  0.218*** 0.928*** 0.690*** 
 n:1275 n:1275 n:1298  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2224 n:2224 n:2367  n:2152 n:2152 n:2222 
ρ 
 0.085*** 0.888*** 0.748***  0.569*** 0.888*** 0.626***   0.134*** 0.915*** 0.803***  0.475*** 0.915*** 0.687*** 
 n:1275 n:1275 n:1298  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2224 n:2224 n:2367  n:2152 n:2152 n:2222 
τ 
 0.064*** 0.710*** 0.559***  0.406*** 0.713*** 0.481***   0.095*** 0.749*** 0.621***  0.332*** 0.756*** 0.540*** 









 0.154*** 0.896*** 0.592***  0.205*** 0.925*** 0.688*** 
 n:1269 n:1269 n:1292  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2227 n:2227 n:2370  n:2153 n:2153 n:2223 
ρ 
 0.069** 0.888*** 0.749***  0.574*** 0.889*** 0.620***   0.123*** 0.909*** 0.810***  0.465*** 0.914*** 0.690*** 
 n:1269 n:1269 n:1292  n:1814 n:1814 n:1881   n:2227 n:2227 n:2370  n:2153 n:2153 n:2223 
τ 
 0.053*** 0.709*** 0.560***  0.409*** 0.714*** 0.476***   0.088*** 0.741*** 0.629***  0.326*** 0.754*** 0.543*** 









 0.164*** 0.888*** 0.590***  0.181*** 0.918*** 0.688*** 
 n:1279 n:1279 n:1300  n:1818 n:1818 n:1885   n:2213 n:2213 n:2355  n:2151 n:2151 n:2221 
ρ 
 0.053* 0.885*** 0.756***  0.578*** 0.890*** 0.624***   0.140*** 0.902*** 0.811***  0.417*** 0.904*** 0.691*** 
 n:1279 n:1279 n:1300  n:1818 n:1818 n:1885   n:2213 n:2213 n:2355  n:2151 n:2151 n:2221 
τ 
 0.043** 0.707*** 0.567***  0.413*** 0.715*** 0.479***   0.099*** 0.731*** 0.627***  0.291*** 0.742*** 0.544*** 









 0.090*** 0.901*** 0.599***  0.166*** 0.916*** 0.685*** 
 n:1278 n:1278 n:1301  n:1818 n:1818 n:1885   n:2204 n:2204 n:2347  n:2135 n:2135 n:2205 
ρ 
 0.058** 0.901*** 0.760***  0.575*** 0.887*** 0.628***   0.135*** 0.903*** 0.810***  0.403*** 0.904*** 0.689*** 
 n:1278 n:1278 n:1301  n:1818 n:1818 n:1885   n:2204 n:2204 n:2347  n:2135 n:2135 n:2205 
τ 
 0.045** 0.730*** 0.570***  0.410*** 0.713*** 0.482***   0.097*** 0.731*** 0.626***  0.281*** 0.742*** 0.541*** 




Table 2 (continued) 
   WIOD(ISIC3)  OECD(ISIC3)    WIOD(ISIC4)  OECD(ISIC4) 









 0.158*** 0.882*** 0.595***  0.164*** 0.922*** 0.691*** 
 n:1275 n:1275 n:1298  n:1817 n:1817 n:1883   n:2214 n:2214 n:2358  n:2146 n:2146 n:2216 
ρ 
 0.038 0.900*** 0.760***  0.565*** 0.885*** 0.625***   0.160*** 0.907*** 0.811***  0.395*** 0.909*** 0.690*** 
 n:1275 n:1275 n:1298  n:1817 n:1817 n:1883   n:2214 n:2214 n:2358  n:2146 n:2146 n:2216 
τ 
 0.032* 0.726*** 0.570***  0.402*** 0.708*** 0.478***   0.115*** 0.738*** 0.629***  0.276*** 0.749*** 0.543*** 









 0.159*** 0.892*** 0.592***  0.153*** 0.920*** 0.693*** 
 n:1279 n:1279 n:1302  n:1822 n:1822 n:1888   n:2208 n:2208 n:2351  n:2144 n:2144 n:2214 
ρ 
 0.026 0.892*** 0.760***  0.557*** 0.882*** 0.629***   0.144*** 0.905*** 0.812***  0.408*** 0.908*** 0.694*** 
 n:1279 n:1279 n:1302  n:1822 n:1822 n:1888   n:2208 n:2208 n:2351  n:2144 n:2144 n:2214 
τ 
 0.026 0.718*** 0.569***  0.396*** 0.704*** 0.484***   0.105*** 0.733*** 0.629***  0.286*** 0.747*** 0.545*** 









 0.143*** 0.886*** 0.590***  0.128*** 0.917*** 0.694*** 
 n:1276 n:1276 n:1299  n:1824 n:1824 n:1890   n:2217 n:2217 n:2359  n:2147 n:2147 n:2216 
ρ 
 0.128*** 0.843*** 0.690***  0.547*** 0.880*** 0.628***   0.136*** 0.904*** 0.814***  0.397*** 0.902*** 0.694*** 
 n:1276 n:1276 n:1299  n:1824 n:1824 n:1890   n:2217 n:2217 n:2359  n:2147 n:2147 n:2216 
τ 
 0.095*** 0.651*** 0.506***  0.389*** 0.702*** 0.483***   0.100*** 0.732*** 0.632***  0.276*** 0.740*** 0.544*** 









 0.080*** 0.907*** 0.588***  0.142*** 0.919*** 0.693*** 
 n:1272 n:1272 n:1297  n:1816 n:1816 n:1882   n:2213 n:2213 n:2355  n:2147 n:2147 n:2217 
ρ 
 0.111*** 0.831*** 0.688***  0.517*** 0.865*** 0.629***   0.134*** 0.906*** 0.814***  0.414*** 0.904*** 0.696*** 
 n:1272 n:1272 n:1297  n:1816 n:1816 n:1882   n:2213 n:2213 n:2355  n:2147 n:2147 n:2217 
τ 
 0.085*** 0.639*** 0.506***  0.365*** 0.685*** 0.483***   0.098*** 0.735*** 0.633***  0.289*** 0.742*** 0.547*** 









 0.099*** 0.905*** 0.588***  0.144*** 0.924*** 0.687*** 
 n:1258 n:1258 n:1282  n:1805 n:1805 n:1871   n:2213 n:2213 n:2357  n:2146 n:2146 n:2216 
ρ 
 0.100*** 0.821*** 0.690***  0.491*** 0.858*** 0.617***   0.137*** 0.907*** 0.818***  0.412*** 0.907*** 0.692*** 
 n:1258 n:1258 n:1282  n:1805 n:1805 n:1871   n:2213 n:2213 n:2357  n:2146 n:2146 n:2216 
τ 
 0.076*** 0.628*** 0.505***  0.345*** 0.680*** 0.475***   0.100*** 0.738*** 0.637***  0.287*** 0.747*** 0.546*** 





Table 2 (continued) 
   WIOD-ISIC3  OECD-ISIC3    WIOD-ISIC4  OECD-ISIC4 










     0.141*** 0.924*** 0.683*** 
 n:1270 n:1270 n:1295  n:1819 n:1819 n:1885 
      n:2149 n:2149 n:2219 
ρ 
 -0.012 0.821*** 0.649***  0.514*** 0.873*** 0.624*** 
      0.407*** 0.910*** 0.689*** 
 n:1270 n:1270 n:1295  n:1819 n:1819 n:1885 
      n:2149 n:2149 n:2219 
τ 
 0.003 0.629*** 0.470***  0.363*** 0.695*** 0.483*** 
      0.284*** 0.749*** 0.544*** 
 n:1270 n:1270 n:1295  n:1819 n:1819 n:1885 





 0.035 0.785*** 0.561***  0.512*** 0.887*** 0.618*** 
          
 n:1269 n:1269 n:1293  n:1815 n:1815 n:1881 
          
ρ 
 0.001 0.824*** 0.661***  0.505*** 0.869*** 0.624*** 
          
 n:1269 n:1269 n:1293  n:1815 n:1815 n:1881 
          
τ 
 0.012 0.632*** 0.481***  0.356*** 0.690*** 0.481*** 
          
 n:1269 n:1269 n:1293  n:1815 n:1815 n:1881 
          
 
Source: Own Calculation. Data: WIOD, OECD. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.01. Notes: r: Pearson, ρ: Spearman, τ: Kendall, n: number of 
industries, TD: Total-Degree, TS: Total-Strength, PR: PageRank. The total number of industries in WIOD-ISIC3, WIOD-ISIC4, OECD-ISIC3, 





Table 3 –Sectoral Coverage ISIC Rev.3 (1995-2009) 
Industries of WIOD & OECD at ISIC3 level WIOD Codes OECD Codes 
   
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing c1 C01T05AGR 
Mining and Quarrying c2 C10T14MIN 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco c3 C15T16FOD 
Textiles and Textile Products c4 
C17T19TEX 
Leather, Leather and Footwear c5 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork c6 C20WOD 
Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing c7 C21T22PAP 
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel c8 C23PET 
Chemicals and Chemical Products c9 C24CHM 
Rubber and Plastics c10 C25RBP 
Other, Non-Metallic Mineral c11 C26NMM 
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal c12 
C27MET 
C28FBM 
Machinery, Nec c13 C29MEQ 
Electrical and Optical Equipment c14 
C30T33XCEQ 
C31ELQ 
Transport Equipment c15 
C34MTR 
C35TRQ 
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling c16 C36T37OTM 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply c17 C40T41EGW 
Construction c18 C45CON 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel c19 
C50T52WRT Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles c20 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods c21 
Hotels and Restaurants c22 C55HTR 
Inland Transport c23 C60T63TRN 
Water Transport c24   
Air Transport c25   
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies c26   
Post and Telecommunications c27 C64PTL 
Financial Intermediation c28 C65T67FIN 
Real Estate Activities c29 C70REA 




Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security c31 C75GOV 
Education c32 C80EDU 
Health and Social Work c33 C85HTH 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services c34 C90T93OTS 
Private Households with Employed Persons c35 C95PVH 






Table 4 – The Sectoral Coverage of WIOD Rev.4 (2000-2014) 
Industries of WIOD & OECD at ISIC4 level WIOD Codes OECD Codes 
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities r1 
D01T03 Forestry and logging r2 
Fishing and aquaculture r3 




Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products r5 D10T12 
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products r6 D13T15 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, etc. r7 D16 
Manufacture of paper and paper products r8 
D17T18 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media r9 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  r10 D19 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  r11 
D20T21 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations r12 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products r13 D22 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products r14 D23 
Manufacture of basic metals r15 D24 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment r16 D25 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products r17 D26 
Manufacture of electrical equipment r18 D27 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. r19 D28 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers r20 D29 
Manufacture of other transport equipment r21 D30 
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing r22 
D31T33 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment r23 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply r24 
D35T39 Water collection, treatment and supply r25 
Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities, etc. r26 
Construction r27 D41T43 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles r28 
D45T47 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles r29 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles r30 
Land transport and transport via pipelines r31 
D49T53 
Water transport r32 
Air transport r33 
Warehousing and support activities for transportation r34 
Postal and courier activities r35 
Accommodation and food service activities r36 D55T56 
Publishing activities r37 
D58T60 
Motion picture, video and television programme production, etc. r38 
Telecommunications r39 D61 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities r40 D62T63 
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding r41 
D64T66 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security r42 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities r43 
Real estate activities r44 D68 
Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consultancy activities r45 
D69T82 
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis r46 
Scientific research and development r47 
Advertising and market research r48 
Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities r49 
Administrative and support service activities r50 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security r51 D84 
Education r52 D85 
Human health and social work activities r53 D86T88 
Other service activities r54 D90T96 
Activities of households as employers; etc. r55 D97T98 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies r56 ⎼  
Total Number of Industries 56 36 
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Table 5 – List of Countries 
List of Countries in Input-Output Databases 
WIOD (1995-2011) WIOD (2000-2014) OECD (1995-2011) OECD (2005-2015)     
1. Australia 1. Australia 1. Argentina 1. Argentina 
2. Austria 2. Austria 2. Australia 2. Australia 
3. Belgium 3. Belgium 3. Austria 3. Austria 
4. Brazil 4. Brazil 4. Belgium 4. Belgium 
5. Bulgaria 5. Bulgaria 5. Brazil 5. Brazil 
6. Canada 6. Canada 6. Brunei 6. Brunei 
7. China 7. China 7. Bulgaria 7. Bulgaria 
8. Cyprus 8. Croatia 8. Cambodia 8. Cambodia 
9. Czech Rep 9. Cyprus 9. Canada 9. Canada 
10. Denmark 10. Czech Rep 10. Chile 10. Chile 
11. Estonia 11. Denmark 11. China 11. China 
12. Finland 12. Estonia 12. Chinese Taipei 12. Chinese Taipei 
13. France 13. Finland 13. Colombia 13. Colombia 
14. Germany 14. France 14. Costa Rica 14. Costa Rica 
15. Greece 15. Germany 15. Croatia 15. Croatia 
16. Hungary 16. Greece 16. Cyprus 16. Cyprus 
17. India 17. Hungary 17. Czech Republic 17. Czech Republic 
18. Indonesia 18. India 18. Denmark 18. Denmark 
19. Ireland 19. Indonesia 19. Estonia 19. Estonia 
20. Italy 20. Ireland 20. Finland 20. Finland 
21. Japan 21. Italy 21. France 21. France 
22. Latvia 22. Japan 22. Germany 22. Germany 
23. Lithuania 23. Latvia 23. Greece 23. Greece 
24. Luxembourg 24. Lithuania 24. Hong Kong 24. Hong Kong 
25. Malta 25. Luxembourg 25. Hungary 25. Hungary 
26. Mexico 26. Malta 26. Iceland 26. Iceland 
27. Netherlands 27. Mexico 27. India 27. India 
28. Poland 28. Netherlands 28. Indonesia 28. Indonesia 
29. Portugal 29. Norway 29. Ireland 29. Ireland 
30. Rest of the World 30. Poland 30. Israel 30. Israel 
31. Romania 31. Portugal 31. Italy 31. Italy 
32. Russia 32. Rest of the World 32. Japan 32. Japan 
33. Slovakia 33. Romania 33. Korea 33. Kazakhstan 
34. Slovenia 34. Russia 34. Latvia 34. Korea 
35. South Korea 35. Slovakia 35. Lithuania 35. Latvia 
36. Spain 36. Slovenia 36. Luxembourg 36. Lithuania 
37. Sweden 37. South Korea 37. Malaysia 37. Luxembourg 
38. Taiwan 38. Spain 38. Malta 38. Malaysia 
39. Turkey 39. Sweden 39. Mexico 39. Malta 
40. UK 40. Switzerland 40. Morocco 40. Mexico 
41. USA 41. Taiwan 41. Netherlands 41. Mexico  
42. Turkey 42. New Zealand 42. Morocco  
43. UK 43. Norway 43. Netherlands  
44. USA 44. Peru 44. New Zealand   
45. Philippines 45. Norway   
46. Poland 46. Peru   
47. Portugal 47. Philippines   
48. Rest of the world 48. Poland   
49. Romania 49. Portugal   
50. Russia 50. Rest of the World   
51. Saudi Arabia 51. Romania   
52. Singapore 52. Russia   
53. Slovakia 53. Saudi Arabia 
  54. Slovenia 54. Singapore   
55. South Africa 55. Slovakia   
56. Spain 56. Slovenia   
57. Sweden 57. South Africa   
58. Switzerland 58. Spain 
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59. Thailand 59. Sweden   
60. Tunisia 60. Switzerland   
61. Turkey 61. Thailand   
62. United Kingdom 62. Tunisia   
63. United States 63. Turkey   
64. Viet Nam 64. United Kingdom    
65. United States    
66. Viet Nam 
    
 
 
 
